At a moment when technology competition is increasingly treated as a proxy for national strength, a late-2023 forecast from Israel has gained renewed attention for what it excludes as much as for what it includes. The Jerusalem Post projected that only six countries would qualify as the world’s strongest technology powers over the next ten years—a list that notably left out the United Kingdom, France and Russia, while elevating two countries many readers did not expect.
The projection was not framed around size or volume. Instead, the analysis drew a sharp distinction between being a “large” technology nation and being a “strong” one. Publishing vast numbers of papers, filing patents or employing armies of researchers may signal scale, the paper argued, but technological strength lies in something harder to replace: the ability to control key technologies that others cannot easily replicate or buy, even at a premium.
By that definition, the Jerusalem Post concluded, the next decade’s technology hierarchy would be led by the United States, followed by China, with Germany, Japan, Sweden and South Korea completing the group.
Why “strength,” not scale, reshapes the rankings
The logic behind the list is rooted in chokepoints. Technologies that merely work are not decisive; technologies that leave others dependent are. The forecast used examples such as advanced manufacturing systems or high-end components, where buyers have little leverage if suppliers refuse to sell.
This approach explains why Sweden appeared on the list despite a population of roughly 10 million—comparable to a mid-sized Chinese city. The country has long invested heavily in research and development. As early as 2006, the Swedish government was already channeling about 100 million kronor into R&D support for small and medium-sized enterprises, helping push national R&D spending to around 4% of GDP, among the highest ratios globally.
That investment produced globally entrenched firms such as Ericsson in telecommunications and Saab, the manufacturer of the Gripen fighter jet. Sweden’s strategy has been depth over breadth: precision manufacturing and pharmaceutical research rather than a sprawling technology ecosystem.
South Korea’s inclusion also surprised some observers more familiar with its conglomerates and consumer culture. Yet by 2023, Japan’s Nikkei Chinese-language outlet was reporting that South Korea’s research strength was beginning to surpass Japan’s, with the quality of its academic papers ranking among the world’s top ten. Facing a persistently low birth rate and a strong sense of demographic urgency, Seoul has treated technology as a national lifeline.
The results are visible in sectors where scale alone is not enough. South Korea dominates high-value LNG shipbuilding and exerts outsized influence over the global memory-chip market through Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, effectively concentrating risk and reward into a few decisive bets.
Old powers, new strategies
Japan and Germany, both ranked behind the United States and China, represent a different model. Japan is often described as lagging in newer arenas such as electric vehicles, but its foundations remain formidable. Decades ago, Japanese policymakers spoke of winning 30 Nobel Prizes over 50 years; so far, the country has secured 19, underscoring the depth of its basic science. Disassemble a high-end smartphone, and many inconspicuous components—capacitors or sensors—still trace back to companies such as Murata or Sony.
Rather than fighting for dominance in consumer endpoints, Japan has increasingly retreated upstream, focusing on materials and manufacturing equipment. The strategy ensures that even competitors depend on Japanese inputs to build advanced products.
Germany’s position rests on a similar logic. From its wartime legacy of advanced engineering to its modern industrial base, Germany remains Europe’s technological anchor. Institutions such as the Max Planck Society—named after physicist Max Planck and encompassing more than 80 research institutes—anchor its scientific reputation. Equally important is its education system, where universities of applied sciences play a major role in training engineers and technicians who can turn designs into physical machinery. As long as Germany’s strength in mechanical engineering and chemicals endures, it remains indispensable to global manufacturing.
At the top of the list, the United States retained first place for what the forecast described as unmatched “zero-to-one” innovation. Breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and projects such as Elon Musk’s Starship launch system illustrate Washington’s continued ability to define technological frontiers and set standards others must follow.
China ranked second, but for a fundamentally different reason. Rather than pioneering every concept, China’s advantage lies in completeness. In recent years, officials have spoken of an “industrial deep dive,” only to discover that equipment initially thought to require state-led breakthroughs already existed in private warehouses. Aircraft carrier arresting cables were traced back to a civilian rope manufacturer; stealth coatings originated from private firms developing anti-rust car materials. China is the only country since World War II to assemble a full spectrum of industrial categories domestically, producing what analysts describe as a powerful spillover effect.
The Jerusalem Post’s conclusion was blunt: over the next decade, technology competition will increasingly resemble a contest of national destiny. The United States will rely on creation, China on completeness, Germany and Japan on precision, and Sweden and South Korea on specialization. Any country content to live off past achievements, the forecast warned, risks falling off the list altogether.
